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ELIMINATING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
SETOFFS UNDER STANDARD UNINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE IN ILLINOIS
The Honorable George J. Schaller*
Uninsured motorist coverage (UMC) was developed by the insurance in-
dustry in response to the increase in automobile accidents after World War
II.1 With UMC, an accident victim need not bear the financial burden of
injuries caused by an uninsured motorist. In effect, then, UMC is insurance
against a tortfeasor's lack of insurance.
In 1963, the Illinois legislature enacted an uninsured motorists statute re-
quiring that all automobile liability insurance policies contain a UMC
provision.2 This law implements a public policy favoring compensation of
innocent accident victims regardless of whether the tortfeasor has insurance
coverage.3 Accordingly, the statute requires a minimum UMC equal to the
minimum liability for death or bodily injury caused by an insured motorist.'
The statute, however, does not prescribe the parameters of UMC provi-
sions. Consequently, in an effort to reduce their liability, almost all insurance
companies operating in Illinois have taken steps to restrict the scope of UMC.,
One such restriction is a setoff provision, 6 under which the amount payable
pursuant to the policy is reduced by any amounts received by the insured
under any "workmen's compensation law, disability benefits law, or any
similar law." 7 Thus, if compensation from one of these collateral sources'
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1. A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 3-4 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as WIDISS].
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1963). As originally enacted, the statute made it man-
datory for insurers to offer UMC provisions. The insured, however, did not have to accept
the coverage. In 1967, the statute was amended to prohibit the insured from refusing to accept
UMC. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1967).
3. See, e.g., Glidden v. Farmers Auto Ins. Ass'n, 57 II. 2d 330, .335, 312 N.E.2d 247,
250 (1974); Morelock v. Miller's Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 49 111. 2d 234, 238-39, 274 N.E.2d 1, 3
(1971); Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 48 Il. 2d 71, 89, 269 N.E.2d 97, 106 (1970).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1967). The statutory minimum liability is currently $15,000.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 7-203 (1981).
5. See 1966 STANDARD FoRM UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT, reprinted in WIDIsS,
supra note 1, at 291 app.
6. Other common restrictions limit the persons covered by the UMC provision and ex-
clude certain vehicles based on ownership or insurance status. Id.
7. Id.
8. A collateral source is any person who compensates a victim of personal injuries other
than the person legally liable for such injuries. See D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 3.6, at 181-86 (1973).
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equals or exceeds the UMC minimum, the uninsured motorist carrier will
not be liable to its insured under the UMC provision.
There is some question as to whether these standard UMC setoff provi-
sions operate to exclude disability benefits paid by the federal government
under the Social Security Act.' This commentary will address the issue of
whether allowing UMC carriers to deduct such disability payments is consis-
tent with the public policy underlying the uninsured motorists legislation.
First, the commentary will examine the rationale supporting the setoff of
worker's compensation benefits. Next, it will discuss briefly the disability
benefits program of the Social Security Act. Finally, it will conclude that
social security disability benefits should not operate to offset UMC liability.
Most importantly, this commentary will demonstrate that to permit insurance
companies to reduce UMC liability by the amount of social security disabili-
ty benefits received by the accident victim is clearly contrary to the public
policy underlying UMC legislation.
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION SETOFF
Illinois courts repeatedly have stated that UMC legislation serves the public
policy of placing a victim injured by an uninsured motorist in the same finan-
cial position he would have occupied had he been injured by an insured
motorist.'" Logically, if the victim of an insured motorist would be entitled
to payments from a collateral source in addition to payments from the tort-
feasor's insurance company, then the victim of an uninsured motorist also
should be entitled to such payments to place him in the same financial posi-
tion as the insured motorist's victim. Conversely, if the victim of an unin-
sured motorist would receive a windfall that the victim of an insured motorist
would not receive, then payments from the collateral source should be ap-
plied to reduce the insurer's UMC liability. Thus, in determining whether
a setoff provision should be enforced with respect to a particular payment
made to the victim of an uninsured motorist, courts should look to whether
the victim of an insured motorist would be entitled to the same payment.
If the answer is affirmative, then enforcing the setoff provision would be
contrary to public policy.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. IV 1980). The standard form setoff clause does not refer specifical-
ly to social security disability benefits. Instead, it refers to "any workmen's compensation law,
disability benefits law, or any similar law." 1966 STANDARD UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSE-
MENT, reprinted in WIDIss, supra note 1, at 291 app. The common sense meaning of "disability
benefits law," however, would appear to include social security disability benefits. See Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1960) (social security system is a form of social insurance). But
see Atkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 382 So. 2d 1276, 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (medicare
benefits are not disability benefits subject to setoff). See generally Liebman, The Definition
of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of
Social Welfare Estates,.89 HARv. L. REV. 833, 841 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Stryker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 74 II1. 2d 507, 512, 386 N.E.2d
36, 37 (1978); Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 69 111. 2d 167, 176, 370 N.E.2d 1044,
1048 (1977); Barnes v. Powell, 49 111. 2d 449, 452-53, 275 N.E.2d 377, 379 (1971); Putnam
v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 48 I11. 2d 71, 87, 269 N.E.2d 97, 105 (1970).
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The Illinois Supreme Court applied this analysis in Ullnan v. Wolverine
Insurance Co.'' In Ullman, plaintiff's decedent was killed in an automobile
accident by an uninsured motorist. Because the accident occurred while
Ullman was acting within the scope of his employment, his widow was en-
titled to, and received, worker's compensation benefits in the amount of
$14,000 from her husband's employer. 2 Plaintiff then sought to recover
$10,000 from her husband's insurance company pursuant to the UMC pro-
vision of his policy. The insurer denied liability, based on a provision
authorizing setoff of "amounts payable on account of such bodily injury
under any workmen's compensation law. .. ."3 Plaintiff sued, arguing that
the setoff provision contravened public policy."'
In rejecting plaintiff's contention, the court looked to the subrogation pro-
vision of the Illinois Worker's Compensation Act.' 5 Under that provision,
an employer who pays worker's compensation benefits is entitled to reim-
bursement out of any amounts received by the employee from the person
legally liable for the injury. Thus, if Ullman had been killed by an insured
motorist whose insurance company paid plaintiff, plaintiff would have been
required to turn the insurance award over to Ullman's employer. The supreme
court noted that the practical effect of reducing insurance liability under
UMC was to put plaintiff in exactly the same financial position she would
have occupied had the driver of the other car been insured; in either case
plaintiff would have been entitled to retain only amounts over the amount
of worker's compensation paid.' 6 Consequently, the Ullman court held that
the setoff provision for worker's compensation benefits was consistent with
public policy.' 7
THE SETOFF CLAUSE AND SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS
The purpose of the Social Security Act,'" at first glance, appears to be
analogous to that of the Illinois Worker's Compensation Act; both are de-
ll. 48 Ill. 2d 1, 269 N.E.2d 295 (1970).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 to .28 (1969).
13. 48 111. 2d at 6, 269 N.E.2d at 298.
14. Id. at 3, 269 N.E.2d at 296. The plaintiff argued that the purpose of UMC was to
provide for insurer liability in the event that the insured was the victim of an uninsured motorist's
negligence. The setoff was contrary to public policy, according to the plaintiff, because it ab-
solved the insurer of any liability if the worker's compensation benefits exceeded UMC liabili-
ty, as was the case in Uliman. Id.
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (1969) provides:
[Il]f the action against [some person other than the employer] is brought by the
injured employee or his personal representative and judgment is obtained and paid,
or settlement is made with such other person, either with or without suit, then
from the amount received by such employee there shall be paid to the employer
the amount of compensation paid or to be paid by him to such employee or per-
sonal representative. . ..
16. Ullman, 48 111. 2d at 7, 269 N.E.2d at 298.
17. Id. at 7-8, 269 N.E.2d at 298.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. IV 1980).
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signed to compensate injured employees. Specifically, the legislative objec-
tive for establishing the social security disability benefits program was to
provide disabled workers with sufficient compensation to enable them to meet
their ordinary and necessary living expenses.9
To qualify for social security disability benefits, an applicant must satisfy
stringent criteria. The claimant has the burden of proving (1) a "medically
determinable physical or mental impairment" that is expected to be fatal
or to last at least twelve months; (2) an "inability to engage in any substan-
tial gainful activity"; and (3) a causal connection between such inability and
the physical or mental impairment."0 If the claimant meets these criteria,
then the burden shifts to the government to prove that there is some work
the claimant is able to perform.2 ' A claimant is entitled to disability benefits
only if he meets his burden of proof and the government fails to prove
that the claimant remains able to work.
As the eligibility requirements demonstrate, the purpose of providing social
security disability benefits is somewhat different from the purpose of pro-
viding worker's compensation benefits. The former focuses on the nature
and extent of the employee's impairment, while the latter focuses on whether
the impairment occurred while the employee was acting within the scope
of his employment. In other words, social security disability benefits are
designed to compensate the injured employee irrespective of the source or
setting of the injury, whereas worker's compensation benefits are available
only when the employee's injury arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
In spite of these differences, both worker's compensation benefits and social
security disability benefits are encompassed within the uninsured motorists
setoff provisions.2" To justify similar treatment of both types of benefits
it must be shown that allowing an insurer to reduce its UMC liability by
the amount of social security disability benefits would not put the victim
of an uninsured motorist in a worse financial position than the victim of
an insured motorist.
There are three reasons why social security disability benefits should not
be deducted from UMC liability. First, as noted above, the rationale behind
allowing the setoff of worker's compensation benefits from an insurer's UMC
liability is that the employer has a right of subrogation with respect to such
payments. The federal government, on the other hand, has no correspond-
ing right to recoup social security disability benefits in the event the
19. 20 C.F.R. § 404.508 (1982).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
21. Corbin v. Califano, 481 F. Supp. 699, 701 (W.D. Mo. 1979). It should be noted that
inability to perform any substantial gainful activity by virtue of a lengthy medical impairment
is only one of three statutory types of disability under the Social Security Act. The other two
are blindness, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1976), and disability for widows, widowers, and surviving
divorced wives, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2) (1976).
22. See supra note 9.
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beneficiary of such payments receives insurance proceeds from the party who
is legally liable for the disability.23 Consequently, the victim of an insured
motorist is entitled to keep social security disability benefits in addition to
any amounts received from the tortfeasor's insurance company. Permitting
the insurer of a victim of an uninsured motorist to set off social security
23. There is specific statutory authority for the government to recoup payments made to
beneficiaries of social welfare programs, but none of these statutes deals with social security
disability benefits. First, the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (1976),
accords the United States government the right to recover from a third party tortfeasor the
reasonable value of "hospital, medical, surgical, or dental" care that the federal government
furnishes to a tort victim. 42 U.S.C. § 2651. The Act confers an independent right of recovery
upon the federal government; hence, the government technically is not subrogated to the vic-
tim's claim. See United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 978-80 (N.D. I11. 1967). The Act
empowers the government to recover from an uninsured motorist carrier the cost of medical
care furnished to an injured party. See United States v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 312 F.
Supp. 1314 (D. Conn. 1970); United States v. Commercial Union Ins. Group, 294 F. Supp.
768, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The statute, however, appears to have no application to social security
disability benefits because it is limited to "hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treat-
ment." For a good discussion of the Medical Care Recovery Act, see Arnot., 7 A.L.R. FED.
289 (1971).
Second, the government may recover overpaid social security disability benefits and old-age
retirement benefits under certain circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). See
generally H. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES § 531 (2d ed. 1978). The
overpayment of benefits may be recovered only if it is determined that the recipient was at
fault, 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1976), or that the recovery would not defeat the legislative purpose
of the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits program, id., or that the
recovery would not violate good conscience and equity, id. Although § 404 permits the Secretary
to recover any overpayment, the section has been applied primarily to recover overpayments
that resulted from errors in the computation of past wages and self-employment income. See,
e.g., Rebak v. Mathews, 438 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). This section does not address
the setting off of disability benefits received from a third party, nor does it grant any right
of subrogation to the government to recover from a liable third party. Thus, this section of
the Social Security Act also has no effect on the payment of liability insurance benefits arising
from an automobile accident.
Finally, under the Medicare and Medicaid Amendments of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (Supp.
IV 1980), items and services that are covered by an automobile or liability insurance policy
or plan are excluded from Medicare coverage. Similarly, medical items and services that are
covered by uninsured motorist insurance also would be excluded from Medicare coverage. See
4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 24,391.31. The Amendments further provide that
if the Secretary has made Medicare benefit payments that subsequently are duplicated by a
private insurance carrier, the government is entitled to seek reimbursement for those benefits.
See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5526 (1980)). Nevertheless, the govern-
ment's right to recoup Medicare benefits does not appear to extend to social security disability
benefits. Section 1395y(b)(l) is expressly limited to Subchapter XVIII of the Social Security
Act, relating to health insurance for the aged and disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (Supp.
IV 1980). The legislative intent in enacting this health insurance program was to provide "basic
protection against the costs of hospital and related posthospital services." 42 U.S.C. § 1395c
(Supp. IV 1980). The social security disability program, on the other hand, was not created
merely to provide for medical coverage. Essentially, the disability benefits program was enacted
to provide the recipient with sufficient income to meet ordinary and necessary living expenses.
20 C.F.R. § 404.508 (1982). Thus, the government's right of subrogation under § 1395y(b)(1)
is limited to Medicare payments, and does not apply to disability benefits.
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disability benefits paid to the victim, then, would place the victim of an
uninsured motorist in a worse financial position than the victim of an in-
sured motorist. Because the subrogation argument sanctioned in Ullman is
inapplicable to social security disability benefits, enforcement of a setoff pro-
vision for social security disability benefits would be contrary to public policy.
A recent decision by the Illinois appellate court supports the foregoing
analysis. In Pearson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,2" the
insurer asserted the UMC setoff clause in an attempt to reduce its obliga-
tion to its policyholder, a Chicago policeman injured by an uninsured
motorist. The police officer had received his usual salary for the period he
was unable to work-a disability benefit specifically authorized by local or-
dinance. The ordinance, however, did not grant the city of Chicago the right
to recoup the disability benefits in the event the disabled policeman recovered
damages from the tortfeasor.
The trial court ruled that the insurer could not set off the disability benefits.
On appeal, the Illinois appellate court noted that the purpose of the UMC
statute was to place UMC policyholders in substantially the same position
they would have occupied had the negligent driver complied with minimum
liability insurance requirements." The Pearson court correctly pointed out
that the policeman would have been entitled to receive his disability benefits
under the Chicago ordinance had he been injured by an insured motorist.
Following the Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning in Ullman,26 the appellate
court observed that if the insurer was permitted to deduct the disability
payments, then the policeman "would not be in substantially the same posi-
tion he would have occupied if the tortfeasor had been insured." 7 The court
therefore held that the setoff clause was invalid as applied to the policeman's
disability benefits.
Although the Pearson decision involved disability benefits under a local
ordinance, the reasoning of the opinion can, and should, be applied to
disability benefits under the Social Security Act. Under both disability laws,
the government is not permitted to recoup its disability payments if the vic-
tim recovers in a suit against the tortfeasor. Similarly, in a case involving
either disability law, allowing a setoff would mean that the total recovery
by the accident victim would differ depending upon whether or not the
wrongful driver was insured. Such an arbitrary result, of course, is prohibited
by the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Ullman.
Public policy concerns beyond those underlying the uninsured motorist
legislation also support the argument that UMC benefits should be payable
without deduction of social security disability benefits. First, the two types
of benefits are not duplicative. Uninsured motorist insurance benefits generally
are designed to indemnify vehicular accident victims, and are recoverable
24. 109 Ill. App. 3d 649, 440 N.E.2d 1070 (1st Dist. 1982).
25. Id. at 651, 440 N.E.2d at 1070-71.
26. Id. at 652-53, 440 N.E.2d at 1072.
27. Id. at 652, 440 N.E.2d at 1072.
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irrespective of an individual's ability to engage in gainful employment. Social
security disability benefits, on the other hand, are designed to provide a
degree of economic security for disabled workers and their dependents, and
are recoverable irrespective of whether the cause of the disability was an
uninsured motorist.28 Thus, the different purposes underlying these two types
of benefits militate against enforcement of the setoff clause.
The second public policy reason for not enforcing the disability benefit
setoff clause is that the injured victim who had paid uninsured motorist
premiums plus social security taxes deserves to have his legitimate expecta-
tions protected. Under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, courts must
interpret an insurance contract so as to provide coverage that an insured
can reasonably expect after reading the policy.29 Because insurance policies
frequently are contracts of adhesion, "[a]mbiguous policy language .. . is
to be construed liberally in favor of the insured." 3 A person who
simultaneously expends funds for uninsured motorist coverage and for social
security disability benefits obviously expects to receive payments from both
sources.
CONCLUSION
The primary consideration in uninsured motorist law should be adequate
indemnification of the injured victim. From the victim's viewpoint, the right
to receive both uninsured motorist benefits and social security disability
benefits should not be dependent upon the insured or uninsured status of
the tortfeasor. Because an insured motorist's victim would be entitled to
retain social security disability payments in addition to any other recovery
resulting from an accident, the uninsured motorist's victim should also receive
social security disability benefits along with any other recovery. Hence, the
uninsured motorist provision authorizing setoff of social security disability
benefits should be held unenforceable.
28. See Harvey v. Clyde Park, 32 I11. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
29. Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as Applied
to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 603, 604-8 (1980) (the doctrine of reasonable
expectations requires that insurance contracts provide the coverage that the insured reasonably
could expect on reading the policy).
30. 7 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900 (3d ed. 1963).

